CHINESE BORDER CONFLICTS – A RECURRING PATTERN 
There is a consistent pattern followed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – one that of creeping but consistent forward movement — which not only strengthens new positions on its territory but also transgresses into areas that we presumed were de facto ‘settled’. 

When Indian troops resist this and the field-level mechanisms fail to resolve the matter, the situation flares up and becomes a challenge for the Indian government. We, first try to underplay the issue, then official spokespersons exchange strong words and finally top leaders talk to each other. A few formal or informal summits later, things quieten down for a year or so, until it happens all over again.

Indo-China border issues

While this keeps the tension levels down for a while, it does nothing to discourage China from expanding its transgressions. Furthermore, it hands Beijing a cheap instrument to apply pressure on the Indian leadership. Just look at the current discourse — no one knows why the Chinese are doing this now. Beijing won’t tell us, which is very obvious. Because we do not know what exactly caused the Chinese response, we ask ourselves whether it was due to 5G, renewed FDI policy, the WHO investigation, the Article 370 move, the new road near Nepal, some new military positions on the border and so on. 

So, a few clashes on some remote, barren Himalayan valleys and India starts considering whether it should get onto the back foot on so many issues that concern ‘Dragon’. How should India respond to a surge in Chinese transgressions at several places along our Himalayan frontiers? Over the past 15 years or so, strategic analysts have recommended two diametrically opposite approaches. 


AGE OLD PRACTICES!
The first, advocated by traditional defense analysts, is that we should hold the line along the Himalayas and escalate the conflict if we have to. They point out that Indian troops enjoy favorable positions in many places, and our strength has been bolstered over the past 10 years with more mountain forces and better infrastructure and equipment. The objective of this approach, they contend, is to make the Chinese realize that they can’t ‘win’ this game. 

The second approach, generally favored by diplomats, economists and many politicians, is that we should defuse the situation through talks and negotiations, because we cannot afford tensions and adversarial relations with China ‘at this time’. Even before the ongoing Coronavirus pandemic crisis, India’s development agenda required that we do not get distracted by military conflicts, not least with a more powerful neighbor, with whom we share an important economic partnership (although it is very lopsided).

The resultant of these two approaches landed us in the situation we are currently in. There is a pattern of ‘normal’ transgression of the disputed boundary by both India and China to ensure that their respective claims are protected. We find ourselves in this unhappy situation because we have failed to literally think out of the box. Escalating the conflict on our borders is not in the very best of India’s interests beyond a point, because having to fight a war will set us back. Relying on talks to kick the can down the road plays into Beijing’s hands.

AN “OUT OF THE BOX” SOLUTION 

A better approach is to shift the conflict away from our Himalayan boundaries to the waters of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. India should demonstrate that it is very much willing and capable of influencing the maritime balance in East Asia, where China is already facing a combination of the US, Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia and sometimes Malaysia and the Philippines as well.

South China Sea issue

As James Stavridis, the former chief of the US navy argues “the key for the U.S. is to gradually bend Chinese behavior without breaking the international relationship in a way that leads into a Cold War or armed conflict. The best way to do that is to bring more international allies into the freedom of navigation patrols”.

Many countries in the region will welcome a stronger Indian role. Given the maritime balance, even a relatively small naval force can have a disproportionate impact in a theater that Beijing is acutely worried about.

India should have done this long ago, but it’s still not too late. We must immediately increase naval operations east of the Malacca Straits and follow up with a rapid tri-service expeditionary capability in the Indian Ocean Region. This should grow into an expeditionary command. Instead of informal summits with Chinese President, PM Modi should keep meeting the leaders of Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan and Singapore. The extensive defense relationships that we have built with many Southeast Asian countries over the years should be quietly utilized.


FINAL THOUGHTS

I do not think we can deter China from using Himalayan skirmishes to throw us off balance unless we go on the offensive elsewhere. The South China Sea/Indian Ocean Region maritime domain presents us with the best options: they are far from our borders but not too far; we have the military capabilities to pursue the option; our naval power is flexible; and the regional geopolitical context is in our favor. Hence, New Delhi’s message should be: “Do not poke us here and we will not poke you there”. And this message should be loud and clear enough.

Of course, we can give many reasons why this is too bold, too aggressive and too risky, and go back to our tried, tested and failed approach. Such actions will just help me republish this post again during the next Chinese mischief.

JAI HIND!

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